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Abhinay Muthoo skillfully synthesizes the literature on non-cooperative bargaining theory 
that was initiated by Rubinstein's (1982) seminal analysis of the alternating-offers bargaining 
game and relates it to the well-known Nash bargaining solution. The book also contains new 
results, in particular regarding the relative impacts of several forces that influence the 
bargaining outcome. Moreover, Muthoo presents many interesting applications of the theory, 
including issues such as optimal asset ownership, bribery and the control of crime, corruption 
in tax collection, and sovereign debt negotiations. 
 
Muthoo first discusses the Nash bargaining solution in chapter 2. We learn that (in the 
simplest case, given risk-neutrality) two parties divide a cake of size 100 by giving each party 
the amount it would get if there were no agreement (say, 10 and 70), plus half of the surplus 
that remains over and above the disagreement point (50% of 100-10-70=20; i.e., the parties 
get 20 and 80, respectively). This bargaining solution is motivated by plausible axioms 
(invariance to equivalent utility representations, Pareto efficiency, symmetry, and 
independence of irrelevant alternatives).  
 
In chapters 3-6, Rubinstein's non-cooperative bargaining game and several extensions are 
presented. In this game a player makes an offer which the other player can accept or reject. In 
the latter case, time passes and the second player makes a counteroffer, and so on. The players 
discount future payoffs. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium the players immediately 
agree on a division of the cake. If the time interval between offers tends to zero, the 
equilibrium shares of the players only depend on the relative size of their discount rates (a 
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relatively more patient player receives a larger share, because his costs of haggling are 
smaller). If the discount rates are identical, the cake is split 50:50 (i.e., according to the Nash 
bargaining solution with the disagreement point 0,0). If there is no discounting, but bargaining 
can break down due to an exogenous event yielding payoffs 10 and 70, the players split the 
cake according to the Nash bargaining solution with the disagreement point (10,70). If there is 
discounting and a party can, in addition to rejecting an offer and making a counteroffer, also 
reject and opt out yielding payoffs (10,70), then the cake is split according to the outside 
option principle: When the discount rates are equal and time intervals between offers 
converge to zero, the party who could get more than 50 receives its outside option payoff (i.e., 
70), while the other party is residual claimant (i.e., it receives 30). If the outside option 
payoffs of both parties were smaller than 50, each party would get 50. The division of the 
cake can also be influenced by inside options; i.e., payoffs that the parties obtain while they 
are bargaining. In general, the disagreement point of the Nash bargaining solution should be 
identified with the impasse point in the alternating offers bargaining game (i.e., the payoffs in 
case of perpetual disagreement).  
 
While the subgame perfect equilibrium in the standard alternating offers game is unique and 
efficient, these properties need not hold in variants of the model. For example, when a player 
can opt out immediately after his offer is rejected, there may be a continuum of equilibria. In 
chapter 7 (on bargaining procedures) it is argued that there can be multiple inefficient 
equilibria if offers can be made simultaneously, if offers are retractable, or if a party can 'burn 
money', e.g. by making the other player wait before he can make his counteroffer.  
 
While chapter 8 discusses some interesting models in which players can partially commit 
(revoking claims that are made prior to bargaining is possible but costly), chapter 9 introduces 
asymmetric information. Under asymmetric information it is possible that for any bargaining 
procedure all Bayesian Nash equilibria are ex post inefficient. Such impossibility results are 
shown for the case of one-sided private information when one party's type enters the other 
party's utility function, and for the case of two-sided private information. Muthoo also 
analyses a model in which one party has private information, while the other party makes 
repeated offers, and relates it to the so-called Coase conjecture. 
 
Finally, in chapter 10 repeated bargaining situations are discussed. Interestingly, the 
equilibrium share of a player may now be smaller if he is more patient (because then his 
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desire to proceed to bargain over the next cake is stronger). Long-term contracts and 
reputation effects are also briefly discussed. In chapter 11, Muthoo identifies several avenues 
for future research.  
 
Throughout the book, Muthoo develops several interesting applications of the theory. For 
example, do penalties have a role in preventing crime if they can be evaded through bribery? 
Consider a thief who bargains with a policeman. From the point of view of the two parties, it 
is efficient if the crime is not reported to the authorities. Thus, in the standard model the 
parties will agree on this outcome. If reporting the crime is taken as the disagreement point, it 
is straightforward to show that if the penalty is sufficiently large, the criminal will not commit 
the crime (because the bribe he would have to pay to the policeman increases with the penalty 
which determines the criminal's disagreement payoff). But if reporting the crime is interpreted 
as outside option, a large penalty has no influence on the bribe (because the policeman's 
outside option payoff is 0, and the criminal's outside option payoff is negative; i.e., according 
to the outside option principle bargaining will result in a 50:50 split of the stolen money). 
Hence, in this case a penalty is useless if it can be evaded through bribery. As another 
example for an application studied in the book, consider sovereign debt negotiations. A 
country owes a large amount of some foreign commodity to a foreign bank. If the parties fail 
to reach agreement on some debt repayment scheme, the country has the possibilities to either 
consume its domestic commodity or trade it for the foreign commodity. In the latter case, the 
bank can seize a fraction of the country's traded output. Muthoo shows how to model these 
possibilities either as outside options or as inside options. Whether international trade 
sanctions (modeled by the fraction that can be seized) have an effect depends on the gains 
from international trade. These applications (other examples include relationship-specific 
investments and litigation versus out-of-court settlement) are discussed in subsections 
immediately following the relevant theoretical results.  
 
Abhinay Muthoo argues in the Preface that this book is partly a textbook and partly a research 
monograph, which is a very appropriate description. We used the book as text for a one-
semester course on bargaining theory. We had to leave out only a few sections and our 
students considered the text to be accessible, even though they thought that there were some 
places where additional and more detailed explanations would be helpful. For instance, why 
has the set of weakly Pareto efficient utility pairs to be closed (Assumption 2.2)? Why is the 
Nash product maximized only over utility pairs on the Pareto frontier? Must the disagreement 
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point lie in Ω? The students were a bit confused by the notation in chapter 5 for cases in 
which the parties' outside payoffs differ depending upon who opts out. We also had to show 
our students how to derive some equations such as (5.6) which they could not work out by 
themselves. The students particularly liked the numerous applications. One interesting 
application which does not yet appear in the book but in our mind is a good addition to 
chapter 5 is the model by de Meza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998) on optimal asset 
ownership and the outside option principle.  
 
While we can recommend the book as a textbook for students with prior knowledge in game 
theory, it is certainly also recommendable for researchers interested in the theory of non-
cooperative bilateral bargaining games. Many recent contributions to the literature that 
appeared since the publication of Osborne and Rubinstein's (1990) important book are 
covered. However, Muthoo does not consider multilateral bargaining and solution concepts 
such as the Shapley value, which has e.g. been applied in the literature on optimal asset 
ownership (see Hart and Moore, 1990). Moreover, the role of bargaining experiments is only 
very briefly mentioned in the last section of the book, although we do have sympathy for the 
views expressed there (see also Rubinstein, 2001).  
 
Of course, chapter 9 on bargaining under asymmetric information cannot provide a complete 
review of the field, which is important enough to merit a book of its own. We think that the 
term 'correlated values' is used in a somewhat misleading way in this chapter, where the 
author refers to common value situations in which one player directly cares about the other 
player's information (for instance, in Akerlof's lemon example). This has to be distinguished 
from private values (every party's information parameter enters only its own utility function) 
which are correlated (see e.g. McAfee and Reny, 1992). An interesting impossibility result 
with one-sided private information (private values) that is not mentioned in the book is proved 
by Klibanoff and Morduch (1995), where reservation utilities are type-dependent. Sequential 
bargaining games under two-sided asymmetric information (and their relation to Myerson and 
Satterthwaite's (1983) mechanism design approach; see Ausubel and Deneckere, 1993) are not 
studied in the book.  
 
One important issue that is only briefly touched in chapter 10 is renegotiation. While 
renegotiation can be beneficial in situations in which only incomplete contracts can be 
written, the fact that parties cannot commit not to renegotiate can only be harmful if complete 
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long term contracts are feasible. Hence, what we generally do not like when we analyze 
bargaining games (that the efficient outcome is not achieved, say due to private information) 
can in fact be beneficial if the bargaining game under consideration is ex post renegotiation, 
which from an ex ante point of view we do not want to function perfectly (see e.g. 
Dewatripont, 1988).  
 
While Muthoo's book clearly demonstrates the enormous amount of basic research on non-
cooperative bilateral bargaining performed in the last decade, this literature is still flourishing. 
For example, Anderlini and Felli (2001) recently showed that there can be a unique inefficient 
equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when participation is a costly decision. 
Moreover, Muthoo impressively demonstrates how bargaining theory can be applied to many 
important economic problems. There can be no doubt that we will see more such applications 
in the years to come. Muthoo's book is an excellent starting point for economists who want to 
contribute to this research. We think that students as well as researchers will benefit from 
reading this book. 
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